Verify the signature
Recompute the HMAC over the timestamp and the raw body, compare in constant time and reject old timestamps.
signature = "sha256=" + hex(HMAC_SHA256(secret, timestamp + "." + rawBody)). Use the raw request body — parsing and re-serialising the JSON changes the bytes and the signature will not match. Reject timestamps more than 5 minutes away from your clock.
import { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
const SECRET = process.env.ZMLE_WEBHOOK_SECRET ?? ""; // whsec_…
function verify(secret: string, timestamp: string, rawBody: string, given: string): boolean {
const ts = Number(timestamp);
if (!Number.isFinite(ts) || Math.abs(Date.now() / 1000 - ts) > 300) return false; // 5 minutes
const expected = "sha256=" + createHmac("sha256", secret).update(timestamp + "." + rawBody).digest("hex");
const a = Buffer.from(expected);
const b = Buffer.from(given);
return a.length === b.length && timingSafeEqual(a, b);
}
export async function POST(req: Request) {
const raw = await req.text(); // the exact bytes that were signed
const ok = verify(SECRET, req.headers.get("x-zmle-timestamp") ?? "", raw, req.headers.get("x-zmle-signature") ?? "");
if (!ok) return new Response("invalid signature", { status: 401 });
const delivery = JSON.parse(raw) as { id: string; event: string; createdAt: string; data: Record<string, unknown> };
// queue the work and answer fast (within 10 s)
console.log("zmle event", delivery.event, delivery.id);
return Response.json({ ok: true });
}import express from "express";
import { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
const app = express();
app.post("/hooks/zmle", express.raw({ type: "application/json" }), (req, res) => {
const raw = req.body.toString("utf8");
const ts = req.get("x-zmle-timestamp") ?? "";
const given = req.get("x-zmle-signature") ?? "";
const expected = "sha256=" + createHmac("sha256", process.env.ZMLE_WEBHOOK_SECRET).update(ts + "." + raw).digest("hex");
const fresh = Math.abs(Date.now() / 1000 - Number(ts)) <= 300;
const same = expected.length === given.length && timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(expected), Buffer.from(given));
if (!fresh || !same) return res.status(401).send("invalid signature");
res.sendStatus(204);
});
app.listen(3000);===: use timingSafeEqual on equal-length buffers. And never log the secret.Marketplace install and uninstall calls
An integration's installUrl and uninstallUrl receive calls signed the same way, but with your listing's app secret (mksec_…, in the developer portal after the first approval, rotatable) and the headers X-Zmle-Timestamp / X-Zmle-Signature. Webhooks that follow are signed with the endpoint's whsec_… secret from the install call.
function verify(req, raw) {
const ts = req.headers["x-zmle-timestamp"];
const sig = String(req.headers["x-zmle-signature"] ?? "");
if (!ts || Math.abs(Date.now() / 1000 - Number(ts)) > 300) return false; // replay window: 5 minutes
const want = `sha256=${createHmac("sha256", SECRET).update(`${ts}.${raw}`).digest("hex")}`;
return want.length === sig.length && timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(want), Buffer.from(sig));
}Written from: docs/API.md, src/lib/integrations/signing.ts, src/lib/integrations/webhooks.ts, docs/DEVELOPERS/INTEGRATION-SPEC.md, examples/marketplace/integration-hello-sync/receiver.mjs, src/lib/marketplace/install.ts