Эта страница пока недоступна на выбранном языке (Русский), поэтому показана на английском.
Verify the signature
Recompute the HMAC over the timestamp and the raw body, compare in constant time and reject old timestamps.
signature = "sha256=" + hex(HMAC_SHA256(secret, timestamp + "." + rawBody)). Use the raw request body — parsing and re-serialising the JSON changes the bytes and the signature will not match. Reject timestamps more than 5 minutes away from your clock.
import { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
const SECRET = process.env.ZMLE_WEBHOOK_SECRET ?? ""; // whsec_…
function verify(secret: string, timestamp: string, rawBody: string, given: string): boolean {
const ts = Number(timestamp);
if (!Number.isFinite(ts) || Math.abs(Date.now() / 1000 - ts) > 300) return false; // 5 minutes
const expected = "sha256=" + createHmac("sha256", secret).update(timestamp + "." + rawBody).digest("hex");
const a = Buffer.from(expected);
const b = Buffer.from(given);
return a.length === b.length && timingSafeEqual(a, b);
}
export async function POST(req: Request) {
const raw = await req.text(); // the exact bytes that were signed
const ok = verify(SECRET, req.headers.get("x-zmle-timestamp") ?? "", raw, req.headers.get("x-zmle-signature") ?? "");
if (!ok) return new Response("invalid signature", { status: 401 });
const delivery = JSON.parse(raw) as { id: string; event: string; createdAt: string; data: Record<string, unknown> };
// queue the work and answer fast (within 10 s)
console.log("zmle event", delivery.event, delivery.id);
return Response.json({ ok: true });
}import express from "express";
import { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
const app = express();
app.post("/hooks/zmle", express.raw({ type: "application/json" }), (req, res) => {
const raw = req.body.toString("utf8");
const ts = req.get("x-zmle-timestamp") ?? "";
const given = req.get("x-zmle-signature") ?? "";
const expected = "sha256=" + createHmac("sha256", process.env.ZMLE_WEBHOOK_SECRET).update(ts + "." + raw).digest("hex");
const fresh = Math.abs(Date.now() / 1000 - Number(ts)) <= 300;
const same = expected.length === given.length && timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(expected), Buffer.from(given));
if (!fresh || !same) return res.status(401).send("invalid signature");
res.sendStatus(204);
});
app.listen(3000);===: use timingSafeEqual on equal-length buffers. And never log the secret.Marketplace install and uninstall calls
An integration's installUrl and uninstallUrl receive calls signed the same way, but with your listing's app secret (mksec_…, in the developer portal after the first approval, rotatable) and the headers X-Zmle-Timestamp / X-Zmle-Signature. Webhooks that follow are signed with the endpoint's whsec_… secret from the install call.
function verify(req, raw) {
const ts = req.headers["x-zmle-timestamp"];
const sig = String(req.headers["x-zmle-signature"] ?? "");
if (!ts || Math.abs(Date.now() / 1000 - Number(ts)) > 300) return false; // replay window: 5 minutes
const want = `sha256=${createHmac("sha256", SECRET).update(`${ts}.${raw}`).digest("hex")}`;
return want.length === sig.length && timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(want), Buffer.from(sig));
}Written from: docs/API.md, src/lib/integrations/signing.ts, src/lib/integrations/webhooks.ts, docs/DEVELOPERS/INTEGRATION-SPEC.md, examples/marketplace/integration-hello-sync/receiver.mjs, src/lib/marketplace/install.ts